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Abstract: Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty 
– in situations where political principles, and even standard 
subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first 
section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision 
theory itself – it is about how to act when we do not have an 
adequate representation of the context of the action and of its 
possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to 
complement decision theory under ignorance – Laplace’s principle 
of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we 
apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting 
Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on 
Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule 
– and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on 
practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its 
computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for 
convergence) – and connect this argument to our moral intuitions 
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and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made 





How should we act in social contexts of great uncertainty 
– when we find it hard to apply our standard political 
principles and face some sort of decision paralysis? Since an 
action aims to an end, the decision to act is irrational if we 
cannot justifiably believe that we can achieve the end – or it 
is self-defeating, if acting in accordance with the decision 
prevents us from reaching that end. 
The decision theory called subjective expected utility solves 
this problem by assigning subjective probabilities to possible 
scenarios, measuring the agent’s uncertainty about them. 
However, one can now reply with a new problem: how to 
assign these probabilities and how to define such an 
evaluation, especially when it includes different individuals’ 
preferences and judgments – computing all possible 
outcomes and all possible values for all possible actions is at 
least intractable. After all, a rational agent would need to 
have an idea of the risks and the opportunity costs of each 
alternative in comparison to others. If this is a common 
problem for individual decision-making, it is pervasive for 
social decisions. Too often, we risk falling into “decision 
 
1 I would like to express my gratitude towards people who read 
previous versions of the manuscript, particularly: (a) my colleagues 
in the Research Network of the Central Bank of Brazil; (b) former 
colleagues from UFRGS’ Graduate Program in Philosophy, 
especially M. K. Oliveira and Paulo MacDonald, who generously 
shared with me their knowledge on contractualist theories; (c) 
finally, the anonymous reviewers, whose critiques and suggestions 
greatly improved the text. 
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paralysis” due to cluelessness – situations where we cannot 
assess the value, nor the long-term consequences of our 
actions (Greaves, 2016). 
The subfield of decision theory that deals with scenarios 
where there is no probability distribution over possible 
outcomes is called decision under ignorance; there are four 
different criteria to complement decision theory under 
ignorance: Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason (a.k.a. 
“principle of indifference”), Wald’s maximin criterion, 
Savage’s minimax regret and the Hurwicz’s criterion. In the 
first half of this paper, we will on decision theory and: a) 
provide an introduction to a canonical model of decision 
theory, the subjective expected utility theory, and also to the 
common obstacles this model faces concerning Knightian 
uncertainty; b) though we do not equate decision under 
ignorance to Knightian uncertainty (actually, our intent is to 
highlight their differences), we explain how Laplace’s 
principle and Wald’s maximin aim to overcome them; c) we 
argue that detaching the notion of risks from subjective 
probabilities is not a solution to the problem posed by 
uncertainty – we criticize Pritchard (2015) as an example of 
this failed proposal. In the last half of the text, we extrapolate 
this discussion to political philosophy: first, we aim to make 
clear that this problem is not restricted to consequentialist 
theories; second, we present and contrast two competing 
conceptions of theories of justice with contractualist 
grounds – i.e., Harsanyi’s utilitarianism and Rawls’s 
difference principle2. We show that the former uses 
 
2 It must be noticed that this is not an exegetical exercise: we don’t 
claim that Rawls should be interpreted as endorsing our position; 
he was more concerned with the basic structure of an ordered 
society than with applying decision theory to real-world political 
problems. However, we do assume the reasoning that parties 
perform in the original position reflect the decision procedure and 
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Laplace’s principle of indifference to cope with the 
uncertainty of the contratualist thought experiment, while 
the latter uses a version of Wald’s maximin rule – leading to 
the much-debated difference principle. We highlight how 
framing the original position as a social contract favors the 
difference principle on the grounds that it better incentivizes 
ex post stable cooperation, and that, thanks to its simplicity, 
it works as a salient point3; this is consistent with common 
social practices regarding decisions made for the sake of 
others, such as norms requiring decision-makers to be 
prudent, which display high uncertainty-aversion. 
 
 
1. Decision theory, risk and uncertainty 
 
Our classic notion of risk is derived from lotteries, chances 
or frequentist probabilities: we say a fair coin flip has a 50% 
risk of resulting in tails. Since in real life we usually do not 
have immediate access to frequencies, the standard 
conception used by risk analysts is based on bets, odds and 
subjective probabilities – according to Savage’s (1972) 
subjective expected utility theory. This theory aims to explain 
 
the arguments here exposed; our focus is on the decision-making 
procedure under uncertainty that leads to principles of justice. 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting that this could 
be read as a Humean argument, which could be accepted by 
utilitarians (as Harsanyi himself briefly touches on something like 
it), in favor of Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness. On the 
other hand, as we sketch in our last section and in our conclusion, 
this is a very limited defense of this account, as our aim is to 
provide an explanation of why our intuitions as rational agents, in 
some situations with potential for conflict and cooperation 
(including the Original Position), bend towards maximin-like 
principles. 
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how agents make predictions and forecasts (or how they 
would consistently make them, if not for mistakes) in relation to 
how they value states of affairs – so that the relative 
probabilities assigned to states s1 and s2 are connected to an 
agent’s willingness to accept a wager on them. This notion 
applies to decision problems characterized by: 
 
A) an agent (the “basic decision unit” within a model 
representing the decision problem); 
B) a set of mutually exclusive actions that one can 
take; 
C) a set of possible outcomes (i.e., states of affairs, or 
possible worlds, following the action). 
 
The decision involves a procedure that defines how the 
agent maps a probability distribution over possible 
outcomes, so representing their uncertainty: a) begins with a 
prior probability distribution that assigns a corresponding 
value to each possible world; b) as they receive new 
information, the agent updates their probability distribution 
by conditionalization (e.g., by using Bayes's theorem) - resulting 
in a posterior probability distribution (Bostrom, 2014, p. 10). 
Furthermore, the agent needs a preference ordering, which 
defines how they evaluate states of affairs; thus, a utility 
function is attributed to them - a complete, continuous and 
transitive order of preferences that associates a number called 
utility with each state of affairs, representing its 
corresponding ‘desirability’ (as proposed by the theory of 
revealed preference). When making a decision, the agent selects 
the action with the greatest expected utility; for this, they 
must compute: a) for each possible world M and each action 
A, the corresponding posterior probability p to reach the 
possible world M conditioned to the choice of action A; b) 
for each possible world M, the product (p x u) of that 
 Ramiro Ávila Peres 6 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
probability p and the corresponding utility u; c) for action, 
the sum of each of these products (Bostrom, 2011, p. 11). 
However, the “rational agent model” underlying 
subjective expected utility theory demands a probability 
distribution across all possible states – which (due to 
combinatorial explosion) is computationally unfeasible in 
real life, and would also imply that an agent cannot have 
“unknown unknowns4.” Even so, we must highlight that 
“putting a number” in a judgement allows one to strive for 
calibrated accuracy in representing one’s own uncertainty. 
Besides, probability calculus allows us aggregate information 
from different agents – as defenders of prediction markets 




1.1 Decision theory under ignorance and Knightian uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is a vague and ambiguous term; we can see it 
as opposed to the concept of information itself. In general, 
it is used in a broad sense applied to decision situations 
where there is no complete and perfect knowledge. It is 
common to adopt Knight’s distinction (1921, p. 46) between 
risk (negative events with accurately measurable probability - 
i.e., the “known risk”) and uncertainty5 (“unknown or 
 
4 In its underlying epistemic logical calculus, this would equate to 
something like ~K(~Kp) (“the agent does not know that she does 
not know that p”), which (assuming knowledge is reflexive: Kp → 
KKp) would imply Kp – i.e., “the agent knows p” (Binmore, 2009). 
5 The term “risk-aversion” is also ambiguous: 
- in game theory, it is equivalent to the concavity of a utility-function 
(Binmore, 2009, p. 50); i.e., if I am indifferent between 1 chocolate 
and 50% chance of winning two chocolates, then my risk-aversion 
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unmeasurable risk”); it assumes a stricter sense where one 
does not have an adequate definition of the probabilities of 
possible states of affairs – the sense used by decision theory 
under complete ignorance. However, even in this case, 
uncertainty can be increased if the agent is unaware of 
relevant possible states of affairs (or of relevant long-term 
consequences of those states of affairs) or even of his own 
utility/value function (a type of normative uncertainty). 
Decision under complete ignorance has often been 
represented as a game against Nature (Binmore, 2009, p. 154), 
where Nature is a fictional “unreasoning entity whose choice 
affects its pay-off, but which has no awareness of, or interest 
in, the outcome of the game.” (Straffin, 2010, 56) One of the 
favorite candidate criteria to fill this lack of a probability 
 
is zero. Henceforth we shall use the expression in this sense, unless 
we state it otherwise.  
- in finance, it refers to volatility - i.e., the (square root of) variance 
relative to the expected return of a portfolio (Mandelbrot & 
Hudson, 2008). If an investment of $ 100 has an expected return 
of 1%, with a volatility of 3%, then, roughly, one can expect to 
receive between $ 98 and $ 104. This is an important factor, since 
the investor has a lower bound for the losses she can bear (i.e., her 
capital) - which explains the asymmetry between risk-aversion as 
loss (limited to capital) and as gains.  
This second notion offers a conservative way of modeling “grave 
uncertainty,” though still applying Laplace’s principle - as an 
unknown (and potentially unlimited) variance. Buchak (2013, p. 44) 
approaches this possibility in a particularly interesting way, arguing 
that risk-aversion should be a third subjective dimension of the 
decision, not reducible to the other two (subjective probability and 
preference functions) - where the most rational decision is the one 
with the greatest subjective risk-weighted expected utility; this 
approach might be interpreted as consistent with financial practice. 
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distribution is Laplace's principle of insufficient reason – whereby, 
in the absence of other information, for reasons of symmetry, 
we assign to possible states of affairs the same probability; it 
is a judgement rule (it tells us how to form our credences), leading 
to a natural extension of the theory of subjective expected 
utility (Binmore, 2009, p. 154-155). 
Another criterion is the more conservative maximin, by 
which agents minimize their exposure to risk, as if Nature 
were an adversary playing a zero-sum game against them 
(Binmore, 2005, p. 33) – so selecting the action that 
maximizes the outcome in the worst-case scenario. This is 
not a procedure for defining the probability of states of 
affairs (i.e., measuring our corresponding uncertainty), but a 
rule for selecting actions. These two criteria are at the basis 
of two competing theories of justice: Harsanyi’s 
utilitarianism and Rawls’s liberalism, respectively – as we 
shall see in section 2. 
The literature discusses two additional criteria that extend 
decision theory to situations of complete ignorance and 
satisfy the axiomatic desiderata of symmetry, strong dominance and 
linearity6 (Milnor, 1954; Binmore, 2009, p. 158); these are the 
Hurwicz’s criterion7 (Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977) and Savage’s 
 
6 However, decision theory under bounded rationality also 
provides attractive criteria that do not fully satisfy these axioms. 
7 It provides a function combining both the maximin criterion with 
a maximax criterion – i.e., actions are evaluated according to both 
their worst and their best possible results, pondered by a new 
parameter, the “Hurwicz constant” h (with a positive value smaller 
than 1) that reflects one’s optimism / pessimism concerning the 
pay-offs (measured in utilities). Suppose a is the worst pay-off of 
an action, and b its best pay-off; then the agent should choose the 
action that maximizes the value of sum of: a) the product of (1 - h) 
times a, and b) the product of h times b. When h = 0, this criterion 
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(1972) minimax regret8. The canonical analysis of these four 
criteria, with a formal comparison between them, is found in 
Straffin (2010) and in Luce & Raiffa (2012). However, we 
notice Hurwicz’s and Savage’s criteria are mostly absent 
from debates in political philosophy9; a possible explanation 
would be that they are too complex for the thought 
 
is reduced to the maximin criterion; when h = 1, it’s reduced to the 
maxmax criterion. 
8 Savage clearly express that his subjected expected utility theory 
should be almost entirely confined to what he calls “small worlds” 
(Savage, 1972, p. 82) – i.e., decision problems with well-defined 
boundaries and measurable subjective probabilities. In “large 
worlds,” he recommends us to adopt a special type of minimax 
algorithm to select actions: starting with the pay-off matrix of a 
decision problem, we should then compute the regret matrix by 
subtracting the pay-off of each possible outcome from the highest 
pay-off we would receive if we had taken another action; i.e., this 
provides us with how much we could “regret” if we had taken such 
an action. Then, we should choose the action with the lowest 
maximum regret. One major problem is that, since the regret matrix 
takes into consideration the pay-off of all the other options, this 
criterion ends up violating transitivity (in Von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms) and the sure-thing principle (in Savage’s 
axioms). Savage “bites this bullet,” saying his minimax rule is a 
“practical rule of thumb in contexts where the concept of ‘best’ is 
impractical. […] it would not be strange, for example, if a banquet 
committee about to agree to buy chicken should, on being 
informed that goose is available, finally compromise on duck” 
(Savage, 1972, p. 206-207). 
9 Particularly surprising in the case of Savage’s minimax regret, 
since he is explicitly concerned with group decisions, pointing out 
the similarity between an ambiguous decision problem (i.e., where 
many different probabilities distributions fit the data) and a 
decision where different agents are in disagreement over the best 
fitting probability distribution. 
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experiments philosophers use to expose their theories – but 
that is not quite accurate, because, particularly after Rawls 
(1971), moral and political philosophers have developed a 
taste for complexity and economic concepts. Another 
possibility is that, though these criteria are adequate for 
decisions under ignorance, they would not extrapolate well for 
decisions under deep uncertainty, where the parties cannot 
agree upon “(1) the appropriate models to describe the 
interactions among a system’s variables, (2) the probability 
distributions to represent uncertainty about key variables and 
parameters in the models, and/or (3) how to value the 
desirability of alternative outcomes” (Lempert, Popper & 
Bankes, 2003, p. 3). Our conjecture is that, unlike Laplace’s 
and Wald’s criteria, they are not intuitive; in the last sections, 
by comparing Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, we 
hope to throw some light on why some principles might be 
considered intuitive – they have salient properties that allow 
for bounded rational agents, in situations of scarce 
information, to converge. 
 
 
1.2 Uncertainty in real life: ambiguity aversion 
 
One way to illustrate the divergence between these 
criteria is the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, in this simple 
formulation exposed by Gintis (2009): 
 
Consider two urns. Urn A has 51 red balls and 
49 white balls. Urn B also has 100 red and white 
balls, but the fraction of red balls is unknown. 
One ball is chosen from each urn but remains 
hidden from sight. Subjects are asked to choose 
in two situations. First, a subject can choose the 
ball from urn A or urn B, and if the ball is red, 
the subject wins $10. In the second situation, 
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the subject can choose the ball from urn A or 
urn B, and if the ball is white, the subject wins 
$10. Many subjects choose the ball from urn A 
in both cases. This violates the expected utility 
principle no matter what probability the subject 
places on the probability p that the ball from 
urn B is white. For in the first situation, the 
payoff from choosing urn A is [0.51u(10) + 
0.49u(0)] and the payoff from choosing urn B 
is [(1-p)u(10) + pu(0)], so strictly preferring urn 
A means p > 0.49. In the second situation, the 
payoff from choosing urn A is [0.49u(10) + 
0.51u(0)] and the payoff from choosing urn B 
is [pu(10) + (1-p)u(0)], so strictly preferring urn 
A means p < 0.49. This shows that the 
expected utility principle does not hold. 
[…] 
The usual explanation of this behavior is that 
the subject knows the probabilities associated 
with the first urn, while the probabilities 
associated with the second urn are unknown, 
and hence there appears to be an added degree 
of risk associated with choosing from the 
second urn rather than the first. If decision 
makers are risk-averse and if they perceive that 
the second urn is considerably riskier than the 
first, they will prefer the first urn. (Gintis, 2009, 
p. 17-18) 
 
What is striking about Ellsberg's paradox is that, even 
after noticing the inconsistency, subjects often remain 
attracted to picking the “safe” urn A (with known 
probabilities). First, they arguably do not regard it as a 
contradiction: they do not consider the information that, in 
urn B, the probability of withdrawing a red ball is negatively 
 Ramiro Ávila Peres 12 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
correlated with that of removing a white ball; i.e., they choose in 
both situations as if they had completely different urns. After 
all, if, in the second situation, instead of the urn B we had 
another urn C (identically described: with an unknown 
proportion q of red balls, but with no correlation to B’s 
distribution), there would be no contradiction – but, instead, an 
arbitrary treatment between the subjective probability 
distribution regarding two identical information sets (B and 
C). It is arguable that, if we framed both choices as a single 
bet, subjects could realize (after reflexion) that picking both 
balls from urn A or urn B results in the same expected pay-
off. 
However, subjects usually do not make this decision by 
determining a probability distribution over the outcomes, 
but by just preferring the urn they have more information 
about. Binmore (2009, p. 89) equates this preference to 
“preferring to settle issues by tossing a coin known to be fair, 
rather than tossing a coin about which nothing is known at 
all,” which usually regarded as a sound policy. We can 
contrast this preference with experiments made by Binmore, 
Stewart and Voorhoeve (2012), showing ambiguity-aversion 
decreases as subjects are assured that outcomes will be 
determined by a random process with no human interference 




1.3 Deep uncertainty: trying to evade probability assessments 
 
If our problem (uncertainty) is that we cannot estimate 
adequately the probability of a hazard, why not to adopt a 
distinct conception of risk that does not appeal to 
probabilities? This is the aim of Pritchard’s (2015) 
conception, which advocates for a “modal account” of risk. 
He distinguishes it from a “probabilistic conception” by 
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comparing two equiprobable events: suppose that a bomb 
will explode if (i) in a lottery, a specific number out of 14 
million is withdrawn, or if ( (ii) a conjunction of bizarre 
events (e.g., the spontaneous pronouncement of a Polish 
phrase in the Queen’s next speech, plus the victory of an 
underdog at the Grand National...) occurs, with an assigned 
probability of 1 in 14 million. According to the argument, 
the second event would be a smaller risk, since it is “modally 
farther away;” i.e., it is in a less “plausible” possible world, 
demanding a greater number of coincidences. A supporter 
of this argument, however, should exchange a loss of $ 
100.01 under condition (a) to get a 6 in a dice roll, for a loss of 
$100 under condition (b) a head-head-tails sequence in three 
unbiased coin flips (under the condition that, if all three flips turn out 
identical, the coin is flipped thrice again)10. Although the second 
condition is more complex - and, in the sense defined by 
Pritchard, “modally more distant” - both are equally likely, 
and the exchange implies an expected loss of $ 0.01.  
There is no simple escape from the probabilistic 
conception: once we begin to assign probabilities to a class 
of events, updating them by Bayes’s rule is the only way for 
the agent to obtain new information without dynamically 
breaking consistency and transitivity requirements – and so 
hedging oneself against sure losses such as dutchbooks 
(Skyrms, 1987). So why is Pritchard’s conception appealing? 
One possible answer is that it uses an intuition pump (we are 
borrowing the expression from Dennett, 2013) enhanced by 
a representation bias: even though we know that both options 
are equiprobable, we prefer the one that is simpler to 
conceive. Something analogous happens when people judge, 
 
10 The probability of any specific outcome would usually be 2-3; but 
in the case of (b) it is 1/6, since the results HHH and TTT are 
excluded. Any finite (additive) probability can be simulated by 
means of a similar process. 
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e. g., that the frequency of a particular letter is higher in the 
beginning of words than in the middle, since it is easier to 
remember words beginning with a certain letter than words 
containing it in the middle; or when tossing a fair coin, 
“people regard the sequence HTHTTH to be more likely 
than the sequence HHHTTT, which does not appear to be 
random,” although by definition both have the same 
probability 2 (-6) of occurring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1977). 
These biases arise because we extrapolate from cognitive 
heuristics – i.e., judgment and decision procedures that usually 
lead to satisfactory results in situations of bounded 
rationality for which our intelligence has evolved. And 
simplicity is often a good proxy for probability, indeed – 
some conceptions of induction depend on that11. Besides, 
simplicity implies lower computational costs, and is usually 
more robust to random noise; in our example, before assigning 
probabilities to the different scenarios, it would be harder to 
compute the more complex one, and it would be more prone 
to errors. In fact, if we added to Pritchard’s thought 
experiment the real and deep uncertainty of the real world, 
the first hard problem would be to decide how to assign a 
credence to the second event; and, even after assigning it, we 
would still distinguish both events according to the amount 
of available information. 
 
11 Besides, simplicity implies smaller computational costs, and is 
usually more robust to random noise. In our example, before 
assigning probabilities to the different scenarios with a probability 
of 10-14, it would be harder to compute the odds of the more 
complex one, and doing so would be more prone to errors (it 
would require working with many probability distributions with 
high variance). That’s not the case of the coin toss, which is 
demonstrably equiprobable with the dice roll, defined by similar 
stochastic processes. 
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Thus, in scenario (i) we have complete information (we know, 
as well as any other agent, what there is to know about the 
relevant variables - the lottery), and our estimate is very close 
to the objective probability of the event12 - it is identical to 
the estimate of any other agent. On the other hand, in 
scenario (ii), we have less information, so that estimates tend 
to be ambiguous (instead of a well-defined probability 
assignment, the agents would estimate it within a relatively 
wide range – their probability distribution would show more 
variance). So it would be tempting to perceive the latter as 
less risky thanks to our aversion to scenarios with greater 
information in loss situations. 
Also, this points to a feature associated with the “decision 
discomfort” we often associate with uncertain situations – 
that they are uncertain because of our limits, because of our 
lack of information; maybe we could be less uncertain if we 
had more data, or time, or intelligence, or minuteness, even 
if we do not know how much more – so that the parameters 
of our decision problem (actions, world states, credence and 
utilities) are drastically affected by our previous choice on 
when to stop reflecting about the problem at hand to finally 
make our decision. In everyday deliberations, it is obvious 
that the information gain from spending more time 
 
12 It is unnecessary to start an ontological discussion on the 
meaning of objective vs, subjective probabilities here (and even 
more on modal realism); this remark works as well with a relative 
notion of subjective probability (in the style of Gilboa & 
Schmeidler, 2003): e.g., I believe that a coin n has an objective 
probability of .5 to result in heads because I have analyzed its 
previous history (i.e., the heads frequency approaches the limit 0.5), 
whereas a coin m, over which I have no information, is deemed to 
have a subjective probability of 0.5 of resulting in heads, because in 
this case I apply the principle of Laplace's insufficient reason. 
Thus, we usually call a probability assignment more subjective 
insofar as it is performed with less information. 
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reflecting on, e.g., the choice between two ice cream flavors 
would be offset by the increased costs of doing so; on the 
other hand, that’s not so clearly the case for life-or-death 
decisions – so we can be expect to deploy different decision-
making processes in these examples. 
We would better interpret Pritchard’s theory as a 
descriptive model of how people actually assess risks (though 
this would require empirical tests and a psychology inquiry) 
– competing with, e. g., Tversky & Kahneman’s (1977) 
prospect theory. It would represent a set of heuristics adopted 
because, in ordinary cases, they approach the reasoning of an 
unbounded rational agent, but at much lower processing 
costs. Indeed, the idea of modal distance from Pritchard's 
epistemology seems compatible with a case-based decision theory 
(Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2003), where, instead of well-defined 
judgments about probabilities, an agent reasons based on the 
similarity between observed events – a kind of instance-based 
learning. Unlike Pritchard, however, Gilboa & Schmeidler 
do acknowledge that: 
 
a) their theory is indeed a theory of bounded rationality 
(Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2003, p. 41), combining 
statistical, deductive, and analogical reasoning13 about 
how people actually decide in very narrow 
information contexts - such as when they cannot map 
 
13 Case-based theory gives prominence to the analogical reasoning 
associated with legal practice - precisely the type of scenario 
focused by Pritchard (2015). The evaluation of evidence in a 
judicial process is hard to capture in an expected utility model 
because the decision-making process is marked by a division of the 
burden of proof between parties and by shared rules and 
precedents. Such rules aim not only to save time and other scarce 
resources, but at values such as publicity and fairness, too, thus 
restricting the quest for accuracy and efficiency (Sunstein, 1994). 
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all possible scenarios, or adequately estimate their 
likelihood or utility (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 2003, p. 1-
2); 
b) in the limit, in a scenario with complete and perfect 
information, both cased-based and expected utility 
theory would make equivalent predictions, so that one 
can be described as embedded in the other (Matsui, 
2000). In fact, Gilboa & Schmeidler (2003, p. 93) 
argue that both are different conceptual frameworks, in 
which specific theories focused on certain types of 
decision problems are formulated, rather than 
competing theories. 
 
So, it is plausible that our problem with uncertainty will 
not be solved by just adopting an alternative conception of 
risk – i.e., by using a different framework to measure 
uncertainty, unrelated to subjective probability functions 
(even if it might provide a good heuristic for some decision 
problems)14. 
2 Uncertainty and normative political philosophy 
 
Normative political philosophers may be tempted to 
deflect the problem of uncertainty by claiming that theories 
of justice say nothing about how agents make judgments 
about what will happen, but focus on how they should behave 
– i.e., it provides prescriptions. However, judgments of fact 
about how people will behave and what may occur are 
relevant insofar as they define what can possibly occur 
 
14 An exhaustive analysis of other decision theories would have to 
include many competing proposals such as Spohn’s (2017) ranking 
decision theory; however, besides our lack of space for this, Spohn 
himself acknowledges that we still lack an account of how 
alternative uncertainty measures can be applied to decision 
problems.  
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(Sorensen, 1995, p. 267). Epistemic limitations may make it 
impossible to identify the act recommended by a particular 
theory of justice: for these cases, the corresponding theorist 
usually recommends special procedures, so that the right act 
becomes the one determined by these procedures; but if the 
method and the corresponding principle diverge, the 
theorist's recommendations assume a paradoxical, if not 
contradictory, character (Kagan, 2018). We can then extend 
the problem of uncertainty from decision theory to the 
theory of justice: one theory is inapplicable if you cannot 
justifiably believe you can reach the goals it prescribes, and 
it is self-defeating if, by acting in accordance with the 
principles it prescribes, you cannot reach those goals.  
Such an argument is often used against utilitarianism – 
i.e., that acting as a utilitarian often ends up in an agent taking 
sub-optimal actions, so concluding with the 
recommendation that agents should not profess 
utilitarianism (if they wish to achieve the best possible states 
of affairs). But utilitarians actually “bite the bullet” and see 
no problem in this objection (cf. Sorensen, 1995, p. 250): 
they often accept the immediate inapplicability of act-
utilitarianism on a case-by-case basis, and then argue in favor 
of something like general policies or even rule-utilitarianism 
– on the principle that adopting general rules and policies 
aiming at general utility would imply ex ante more general 
expected utility than individually and constantly deciding 
which action has the most general expected utility (see, e.g., 
Harsanyi, 1985). 
It is a mistake to think this objection is confined to 
consequentialist or teleological theories. After all, the 
consequences of an action may also be relevant to 
deontological theories15 - otherwise, these theories would be, 
 
15 Especially when dealing with distributive justice; in the preface 
to Sovereign Virtue, Dworkin (2000) argues that every action or 
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according to the words of a deontologist himself, simply 
“insane” (Rawls, 1971, p. 26)16. For instance, deontological 
conceptions of individual rights must include considerations 
of consequences when dealing with risks, harms and 
compensation – as when determining if one’s action creates 
an acceptable risk of harm for others (e.g.: Nozick, 1990, p. 
73; Dworkin, 2011, p. 290). Even a Kantian would not be 
completely immune to the objection: one may have to worry 
about the consequences of an action when one defines a 
maxim to apply the categorical imperative on (Gibbard, 





omission of the state benefits someone, and that we can estimate 
who is this person; so we should be able to justify the status quo to 
the worst-off - since we could have made different decisions. 
However, if no one is able to predict or adequately estimate the 
relevant consequences of a public policy, then one cannot reliably 
provide such justification. 
16 One can argue whether uncertainty could threaten even Rawls’s 
difference principle: “(...) that social and economic inequalities 
must be arranged so that they are of the greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged. Insurmountable problems about measuring social and 
economic status might make a mystery of what counts as satisfying 
this obligation” (Sorensen, 1995, p. 248).  
17 In Kantian philosophy, “perfect duties” are inviolable limitations 
that moral law imposes on agents (e.g., never make a promise 
without intending to fulfill it); unlike “imperfect duties”, which 
refer to cases where moral law requires one to adopt an end, and so 
allow for the possibility that the action might be objected on other 
grounds – for instance, assisting others is an imperfect duty, which 
might be trumped by perfect duties (if the project is morally 
objectionable) or additional imperfect duties – e.g., if the cost of 
doing so is too high (Johnson & Cureton, 2016). 
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2.1 Uncertainty and impartiality in a social contract 
 
One can see the problem of deciding under uncertainty 
as an embarrassment of riches: the absence of information 
prevents us from constraining our “search space” in a way 
that would allow for a straight application of expected utility 
maximization. So, instead of deflecting the objection, a 
theorist may claim that political philosophy can provide 
additional criteria to complement decision theory – such as 
impartiality or fairness. 
The most famous thought experiment to test a principle’s 
impartiality is the Rawlsian original position, in which, under a 
veil of ignorance, subjects are unaware of their particular 
features and interests (Freeman, 2016). However, Harsanyi 
(1953; 1975) presents an analogous thought experiment (the 
impartial observer) with a utilitarian conclusion: by applying the 
principle of insufficient reason, an individual in such a 
situation would assign the same ex ante probability to 
occupying anyone’s position in a society. Therefore, without 
appealing to one’s own utility function (i.e., one’s personal 
preferences) and position in society, the rational agent would 
choose principles leading to the greatest general expected 
utility. For Rawls (1971), though, in face of a similar 
uncertain scenario, an agent would want some hedge against 
risky alternatives – so including, among the principles of 
justice, the difference principle, whereby wealth and income 
inequalities shall be arranged as if to benefit the worst-off 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 72). 
The two authors get to different conclusions mainly 
because, despite these similarities, they in fact use qualitatively 
different experiments with different objectives (Moehler, 
2015). First, there’s a distinction on what is being distributed 
in those scenarios: in Rawls (1971, p. 65), there are agents 
who are in the process of defining the basic structure of the 
distribution of the “benefits and burdens of cooperation” of 
  The Harsanyi-Rawls Debate 21 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
a stable society – i.e., resources. In Harsanyi, they must 
choose which distribution of utility they would prefer – i.e., 
what possible world they would prefer to live in, when they 
only know such distribution (thus not including information 
on how cooperation will occur). Thus, this seems like asking 
someone about who one would like to be, or in which world 
one would like to live; assuming a constant population and 
an equal probability of occupying the place of any individual, 
a rational agent would prefer to live in the world with the 
highest average expected utility (Harsanyi, 1975, p. 598) – 
i.e., the situation where an agent is more likely to satisfy a 
greater number of their own preferences. But in this 
situation, it makes little sense to talk about a social contract: it 
is like asking whether one would rather be born in a 
paleolithic egalitarian community, with a 30-year life 
expectancy and an income Gini-index close to zero, or in the 
21st century18. 
On the other hand, despite defending the utilitarian 
principle as the right foundation of morality, Harsanyi 
himself considers that a maximin principle (used to justify the 
difference principle) can be a good proxy for the utility 
principle in real-world applications, such as the problem of 
“optimal income distribution or of optimal taxation,” so 
 
18 One problem with this distinction is that it allows us to ask 
whether, in fact, the original position is the best context from 
which to determine the principles of justice that our society must 
adopt. This is a point often made by Sen (1999; 2009, 93): the 
question about which principles to adopt depends on the type of 
information available - even in the original position. Also, this 
explains why the “equality of what?” debate (resources vs. utility) 
is irrelevant to our present analysis of the original position (though 
crucial to post-Ralws political philosophy). After all, if agents have 
only information about utility in the original position, then their 
decision would reflect that; but if all they know is the distribution 
of something else, such as resources, they will take another decision. 
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making use of a distinction between “basic philosophical 
principle” and principles applicable to decision-making 
(Harsanyi, 1975, p. 606). In other words, the difference 
principle might be a good heuristic for these pragmatic 
problems19; it is attractive particularly because it tends to be 
less informationally demanding – one needs only to identify 
the alternative with the best lowest pay-off. 
We can extend this argument to the reasoning about the 
interaction with other agents (modeled as a game of partial 
conflict): even if one regards Harsanyi's argument as a solid 
ground for utilitarianism as a comprehensive philosophical doctrine 
– at least in the situation where we have no other information 
 
19 There is an alternative heuristic, often neglected by philosophers 
and economists: while the average expected utility principle makes 
us choose the action associated with the highest average utility, 
the median heuristic has us choosing the action with the highest 
median in the same distribution: “Statistically, expected value is the 
central tendency of the distribution embodied in a risky gamble. 
For highly non-Gaussian distributions, the mean is not considered 
a valid estimator (…). The median, an alternative estimator of 
central tendency, is robust to noise and is often favored for highly 
skewed distributions.” (Hayden & Platt, 2009) 
Statisticians prefer to use the median as an estimator because, in 
the absence of additional information, the variable (in our case, the 
hypothetical agent) is equally likely to result placed above or below 
the median position; it works even for pathological probability 
distributions, such as the Cauchy distribution, that have no definite 
mean. This is arguably the case of inequality: the distribution of 
income in complex societies is incompatible with a normal 
distribution (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2008). Thus, the median 
heuristic in the original position (i.e., choosing a society that 
maximizes the utility of the individual in the median position) 
would tend to converge more towards the difference principle than 
towards utilitarianism - though it does not coincide with none of 
them. 
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on the decision problem – it does not provide a stable reason 
for anyone already embedded in a society to support 
corresponding utilitarian institutions; on the contrary, it may 
seem revolting for the worst-off to hear from the best-off: 
“I regret your misfortune, but we had the same priors for 
success, and my happiness offsets your misery.” Harsanyi's 
solution, therefore, underestimates the need for acceptance, 
coordination and cooperation (as argued by Regan, 1985; 
Gauthier, 1984, p. 71). In a utilitarian society, those favored 
by the benefits of cooperation would not be the neediest, but 
those with the greatest potential for increasing overall 
marginal utility; this may coincide with the worst-off  – given 
the law of diminishing returns20 – but not necessarily. As in 
the management of a productive activity, an efficiency-
oriented society would be tempted to transfer resources to 
agents capable of increasing the “production” of utility (Sen, 
1979, p. 9)21. 
 
20 “It is a perennial idea of the utilitarian school that if utilities are 
concave, egalitarian consequences will follow from the sum of 
average rules.” (Mongin & Pivato, 2016, p. 734) However, neither 
utilitarianism nor maximin give us reasons to prefer, in the original 
position: 
1. distribution of 1 utility to A (with probability of 50%), or to B 
(with probability of 50%), or 
2. distribution of 1 utility to A.  
A Rawlsian agent would choose option (i), not for the difference 
principle itself, but because it matches the spirit of the equal 
opportunity principle.  
21 The difference principle also allows redistributing resources 
‘upwards’, to more productive people, as an incentive - but only in 
order to latter improve the situation of the worst-off. This is the 
‘argument from incentives’: “Supposedly, [...] the greater 
expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to raise the 
prospects of laboring class. Their better prospects act as incentives 
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Thus, in Rawls, the support for the difference principle 
involves more than the simple fact of uncertainty. The 
original position is not only a decision under complete 
ignorance against Nature; it anticipates interactions and 
bargains, either conflict or cooperation, that might occur 
after the withdrawal of the veil of ignorance22. So the 
principle aims to provide a basis for a social contract, 
assuring the worst-off citizens that the only way to improve 
their ex post relative condition would have been by putting 
others in a similar or worse position. This justification 
appeals to demands of stability, publicity and reciprocity 
(Freeman, 2016; Rawls, 2001, p. xvii): if a society must 
organize itself according to principles that everyone can 
identify and accept, then it has to be able to sacrifice 
potential efficiency for the sake of increased fairness and 
stability23. Hence, Binmore (2005, p. 170) argues that liberal 
egalitarianism would be the option for a social contract in 
the absence of an external entity to define and enforce social 
 
so that the economic process is more efficient, innovation 
proceeds at a faster pace, and so on.” (Rawls, 1971, p. 68) 
22 This characterization may be controversial - but it seems to 
follow from the idea that there must be a link between the original 
position and society after the veil’s withdrawal. Gauthier (1984) 
and Binmore (2005) rather conceive the original position as a game 
(a non-parametric decision situation); however, they model it as a 
bilateral bargaining problem, which might not adequately represent 
various aspects of a social contract with a plurality of parties, such 
as the emergence of coalitions, reputations, and conventions 
(Sugden, 2001, p. 235). 
23 For Binmore (2005, p. 5-9), this is the most important desideratum 
of social norms and the greatest appeal of political liberalism, for 
an evolutionary reasoning - i.e., considering the simple fact that 
unstable norms by definition do not persist for a long time (either 
they are changed, or society dissolves). 
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norms – i.e., where social norms would have to be enforced 
by all individuals. 
This highlights that, for Rawls, the decision in the original 
position is seen as a reason for any individual to comply with 
the social contract even after lifting the veil of ignorance - for, 
as we have pointed out, it is a matter of defining the 
principles on which we would cooperate. Thus, one can 
argue that the difference principle provides better incentives 
for this goal and enhances social trust: in a Rawlsian well-
ordered society, the best-off could say to the worst-off that 
improving the prospects of the latter would imply an even 
worse condition for someone; but, in a utilitarian society, all 
they can say is “my joy compensates your pain,” which, in 
real life, may fuel class struggle. 
Even without the possibility of being abused, 
utilitarianism provides a reason only from a more detached 
point of view, an ex ante perspective, and it would be 
tempting for citizens to complain about it ex post: 
 
(…) current individuals would not see the 
reasons for the chooser in Harsanyi’s original 
position as reflecting their reasons. In this way, 
the justificatory link between the model of 
rational choice in the original position and the 
reasons of actual individuals in society would 
be severed. Individuals will not see Harsanyi’s 
justification of average utility as justification for 
them. (Gaus & Thrasher, 2015, p. 57) 
 
Why is the difference principle supposedly more 
acceptable, more susceptible to foster stable cooperation? 
Since it can be justified by reasons compatible with different 
reasonable philosophical frameworks, appealing to 
individuals in different situations, and since, as Harsanyi 
admits, it is computationally simpler, Ralws’s difference 
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principle may work as a Schelling (2015) point for people with 
distinct comprehensive doctrines and cognitive resources – 
a salient equilibrium to which all can converge. 
 
 
3. Coping with uncertainty: moral intuitions and 
responsibility in groups 
 
The reasoning above contrasts with other non-
consequentialist arguments, which philosophers often claim 
to reflect primitive and intuitive moral principles. Instead, we 
argue that the intuitive appeal of the difference principle 
actually flows from its simplicity (i.e., it is cognitively less 
demanding), making it a more acceptable principle for 
coordination (particularly under the threat of disagreements 
that may affect social cooperation). 
A similar argument might explain the origins of the 
distinction between actions and omissions (e.g., the 
difference between “killing and letting die”), underlying the 
intuitive appeal of a status quo bias: we usually do not hold 
people accountable for “doing nothing”, particularly under 
uncertainty, because that’s what is expected from them as a 
default action. However, “doing nothing” is not the most 
accurate description of someone’s behavior, since we can 
always be described as subjects of some trivial action (e.g.: 
breathing); in fact, “doing nothing” usually means “doing 
whatever one is already doing by default, making no additional 
conscious decision…” 
From an individual point of view, this is often a sensible 
principle, guiding how we distribute burdens and 
responsibilities; think about a simple cooperative interaction, 
like playing volleyball: when a ball falls between many 
players, whoever takes the initiative must communicate this 
to others, thus assuming the responsibility for catching it. 
The others must “do nothing” (i.e., wait and stay alert), so 
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minimizing the risk of interference and harmful collisions. 
On the other hand, if the ball falls closer to one specific 
player, we assume it is her responsibility – it is the alternative 
with the lowest marginal cost. Too often, though, amateurs 
let the ball drop among them because it is not clear who 
should move to catch it – they face a (micro) social dilemma; 
“doing nothing” is a bad decision procedure in this case. This 
does not happen among professionals, who have a strong 
bias for claiming responsibility for themselves when they are 
uncertain, so minimizing the collective risk of an adverse 
score. We can wonder if this decision procedure is optimal: 
should not those players reason about who is the best catcher 
for each ball? 
Extrapolating from this rough analogy to social decision-
making, “doing nothing” would be like this individualistic 
heuristics: in the absence of social norms and collective 
concerns, “do nothing,” lest you often assume responsibility 
for harming others unnecessarily. Harsanyi’s utilitarianism, if 
taken to its extreme, would recommend us to find out the 
optimal solution (in the case of volleyball, the best move to 
maximize the chances of scoring a point for each ball); but 
utilitarians are often more pragmatic than that, and would 
recommend a maximin principle that all defenders could 
follow: first, minimize our risk and catch the ball, and so 
define a strategy to score a point later on. 
However, here is the difference between this “volleyball” 
metaphor and the theory of justice (and the debate over its 
underlying decision theory): it is very clear what are our goals 
in playing volleyball, and also most of our constrains, so the 
only remaining uncertainty is in the facts. Notice we are not 
so arguing for the difference principle as a proxy that would 
help us satisfy the average utilitarianism, as Harsanyi argued 
– because, just like the original position (and our metaphor 
of the volleyball game), Harsanyi’s impartial observer is just 
another thought experiment; Instead, in explaining the intuitive 
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appeal of the difference principle in a social contract situation 
like the original position, we highlighted features that might 
be identified in other social decisions. 
 
 
3.1 Deciding for others: prudence and precaution 
 
We often demand that authorities decide in ways that 
deviate from utilitarianism. For instance, consider the claim, 
from authors such as Buchak (2017) and Otsuka & 
Voorhoeve (2009), that the shift from the perspective of an 
individual decision to that of interpersonal decisions changes 
the principles we must use to decide. This results in the so-
called risk-principle: “When making a decision for an 
individual, choose under the assumption that he has the 
most risk-avoidant attitude within reason unless we know 
that he has a different risk attitude.” (Buchak, 2017, p. 632) 
In environmental law and sanitary policies, companies are 
often required to comply with a precautionary principle requiring 
them to demonstrate that an activity doesn’t offer risks for 
others; a bad interpretation for this principle is that it 
complies with some sort of status quo bias argument. 
However, it has the advantage of balancing the information 
asymmetry between the public and the innovator, so 
imposing the burden of researching and publishing effects 
on the latter (Picavet & Lafaye, 2012) – it is a practical 
solution for the problem of cooperation in an uncertain 
context. Analogously, the prudence principle in accountancy 
determines that an asset of an uncertain value must be 
written according to its lowest assessment, in order to avoid 
overestimation (because assessing the value of an asset is 
usually a task for the security’s owner, not for their creditors). 
The principle was so incorporated into professionals’ 
practice (because of the advantage of a reputation of 
prudence) that, even after recent legal changes, firms keep 
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adopting it – it is often less costly than developing a precise 
and debatable model to classify different risks (Kronbauer et 
al., 2017). 
Moreover, this also echoes a concern about the 
relationship between managers and investors; in financial 
markets, institutions are required to disclose information 
about their risk appetite - the higher it is, the more information 
to disclose. Also, risks are to be managed aiming at 
institutional robustness, in order to optimize resistance to 
failure – I.e., losses an institution may not recover from. A 
system is robust if it can keep functioning, despite internal 
and external risks, without drastic changes in its structure 
(Lempert & Collins, 2007); by modus tollens, if a system is not 
robust, in an environment with risks arising from random 
processes, either it will break, or its structure will change. 
Thus, in some activities involving externalities, managers are 
required to adopt measures to resist to uncertain events, 
minimizing the risk of failures that could threaten economic 
activity, even if their probability is small or unknown (where 
they would be underestimated in a day-by-day cost-benefit 
analysis). 
Similarly, that’s how we often reason in preventing social 
harms: Shrader-Frechette (2014, p. 194) argues that we 
should favor Rawls’s theory over Harsanyi’s in cases of 
decision-making with high uncertainty having: a) a society as 
a scope (and not just an individual), b) unequal distribution 
of adverse outcomes and c) potential for catastrophe24. Even 
 
24 It’s hard to define catastrophe. Cooke (1985) uses as an example 
of a catastrophic event disasters that extinguish life - implying a 
state of things with no measurable value; this is different from a 
state of affairs with ‘zero utility’. On the other hand, Yudkowsky 
(2008) uses the term ‘catastrophe’ to refer events of global impact 
(such as the death of millions). This does not correspond to the 
relative sense we are use using, which includes impact events within 
an activity. However, it also does not correspond to the more usual 
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if a society committed to preventing such scenarios 
compromises part of the well-being of some citizens, that is 
considered an acceptable price – otherwise it would risk 
compromising the well-being of the worst-off, who have 
fewer chances of protecting themselves25. 
Conclusion 
 
First, we have seen that the problem of uncertainty is 
pervasive: we cannot escape the problem of ignoring the 
consequences of a decision – otherwise such a theory might 
be inapplicable. We argued that, in situations of social risks, 
the adoption of the difference principle, according to the 
maximin criteria, justifies the action to all parties involved; 
moreover, as noted by Harsanyi himself, this principle is 
easier to apply than the utilitarian principle because it has 
lower informational requirements - it is epistemically simpler 
to identify and avoid worst outcomes. We showed how this 
 
sense of catastrophe used by Shrader-Frechette (2014), which 
includes incidents involving the death or disability of a large group 
of people.  
This seems to include both the idea of a state of things difficult to 
assess (of very high impact - in which the prospect of recovery is 
nil, or improbable) or to estimate (great uncertainty); this is a 
practical problem for the subjective expected utility theory, since it 
often associates the subjective probability assigned to an event with 
an agent's propensity to bet on it (as in Ramsey, 1931). 
25 It may be unnecessary, but we must remark that this reasoning 
cannot be extrapolated to justify authoritarian control, 
incompatible with a liberal society – at least for Rawls; after all, by 
the same argument of the original position, the parties would 
choose the principle of equal freedom and the principle of equal 
opportunities - which take precedence over the difference 
principle. An autocratic society can be seen as the first risk the 
parties in the original position would seek to secure against. 
  The Harsanyi-Rawls Debate 31 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
reasoning may explain our moral intuitions and how it is 
consistent with social norms concerning risk allocation. 
We must remark, though, the limitations of our 
argument: it doesn’t mean that the maximin is a good criterion 
for decision theory in general; it does not extrapolate to 
individual decision-making, nor even to cases where the 
boundaries of a decision problem can be well-defined. We 
only argued that, in uncertain social contexts, it provides a 
more acceptable justification for policies than utilitarianism. It 
is a decision rule, for coping with uncertainty, not a judgement 
procedure, for reducing it; i.e., it is a policy to select actions in 
the face of uncertainty, not a procedure to precisify our 
credences when we lack information – so it doesn’t solve the 
problem of assigning probabilities to different possible 
states. Finally, we highlight that we ignored population ethics 
and intergenerational conflict – i.e., our argument explicitly 
appeals to the need for stable cooperation between present 
agents, not future ones26. 
 
26 Harsanyi points out, e.g., that Rawl’s theory doesn’t pay enough 
attention to intergenerational justice, and possibly implies zero net 
savings (since future generations tend to be better-off thanks to 
technological progress).That’s true: Rawls proposes a just savings 
principle according to which we only have a duty to legate to next 
generations wealth enough for them to sustain a well-ordered 
society (it does not mean there are no other reasons to increase this 
endowment, though). But Harsanyi (1975, p. 602) himself 
complains that utilitarianism requires too much savings for the 
next generations (unless we make use of a social discount rate, 
which defeats the egalitarian value of utilitarianism, by privileging 
the present). We avoid this discussion here because, despite its 
huge importance, population ethics is hard, no matter what 
principle one chooses, so both the difference principle and the 
average-utilitarianism do not provide satisfying answers for long-
term matters. 
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Rawlsians may dislike this conventional, even naturalistic, 
account of a theory of justice; it seems to lack the normative 
‘flavor’ we usually expect from arguments of principle. 
However, instead of thinking of this as a reduction of a 
normative theory of justice to a non-normative theory of 
conventions, we suggest one should see it as an argument 
over the conditions under which principles of justice can be 
applied: even in the absence of a common agreement on 
what precise norms should be chosen and followed, or on 
what is the best conception of good, bounded rational agents 
can converge in a meta-level, particularly if they know they 
need to cooperate with each other. Actually, we dare to 
conclude by suggesting that this might be the main function 
of a normative theory – a theory about how agents should 
proceed: to allow for some guidance for the cooperation of 
bounded rational agents under uncertainty. If we could 
determine a cardinal utility function for each agent, and a 
corresponding precise probability distribution over 
outcomes, we would have no need for a normative theory of 
any kind; game theory would be enough to provide us with 
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